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Introduction 
Professors Yang, Zhang and Zhou (YZZ) provide useful insights into the question in the title 
of their paper. As their work covers a lot of interesting ground in a highly professional 
manner, I shall not offer a detailed critique. Instead, I shall propose some alternative 
perspectives on their work that link China’s savings rate to fundamental aspects of its modern 
history and political economy. Specifically, I link China’s high savings rate to (i) the social 
capture of the rents and capital gains foregone by the landlords and capitalists expropriated 
after 1949, (ii) the recycling of those surpluses into investment by both private companies 
and state-linked companies. The capital gains on the expropriated assets were massive when 
China opened up its economy and revalued those assets at world prices. The recycling of the 
surpluses into investment was massive because China’s state-linked corporations effectively 
have no owners, but their managers now earn both monetary and political credits from good 
performance. We might say that China’s savings are high because of Mao Zedong, Deng 
Xiaoping and the “social market economy with Chinese characteristics”. 
Evidence from the Relative Purchasing Power of National Currencies 
A useful perspective on the “revolutionary” origins of China’s high savings is provided by 
the well-known impact of revaluing China’s GDP according to Purchasing Power Parity. 
China’s currency stands out from competing countries in enjoying high purchasing power 
relative to the US$. According to 2007 World Bank figures, 1 yuan buys in China 2.21 times 
what its US$ equivalent at market exchange rates would buy in the US. For Brazil, Mexico, 
and Poland, the corresponding factor is about 1.43. 
So Chinese firms could pay 1.43/2.21 = 0.65 of the salaries in these three countries, yet their 
workers would enjoy the same purchasing power. The Chinese firms competing with firms 
from these three countries could capture the difference as higher profits. YZZ show that 
profits are mostly saved, rather than being paid out as dividends. 
Or the Chinese firms could pay more, say, 0.85 of the salaries in the other countries. Then the 
Chinese workers could consume as much as workers in the other countries, yet save more of 
their income. Meanwhile, the Chinese firms would face a wage bill equal to only 0.85 of their 
foreign counterparts, allowing higher profits and savings. If the Chinese firms were 
competing with US firms, then more savings would be possible.  
If a Chinese firm A were producing inputs for another Chinese firm B that exports, then A 
could charge less than international prices (at market exchange rates). A’s profits would be 
lower than discussed above, but B’s profits would be higher. If A were producing goods that 
were consumed in China, then it could charge less than international prices (at market 
exchange rates). Then its profits would be lower than discussed above, but the cost of living 
would be lower also.   2
So, whatever prices of B-to-B and B-to-C transactions in China, Chinese firms and workers 
would jointly enjoy the additional opportunities to save discussed above.  
Chinese Interest Rates and Dividends 
State-related firms can access low-cost loans from state banks; their loans are often forgiven. 
The resulting advantage over international counterparts shows up as higher profits and/or 
higher disposable income of the workers. Giovanni Ferri and Li-Gang Liu
1 argue that almost 
all the profits of state-related enterprises can be explained by favours from state banks.  
How could Chinese banks afford to charge low interest rates and forgive loans to state 
enterprises? They pay low deposit rates. In the past, they were recapitalized by the Chinese 
state — from taxation and seignorage. As China’s market economy had grown fast and its 
immature financial system ensured a low velocity of circulation, it could print a lot of money 
without triggering inflation.  
YZZ report that Chinese firms pay essentially no dividends. Unlike firms abroad that do pay 
dividends, they can save and reinvest all the dividends and/or charge lower prices and/or pay 
higher wages. Whatever the prices of B-to-B and B-to-C transactions in China, Chinese firms 
and workers as a whole would enjoy additional opportunities to save.  
Chinese Rents 
The state owns all land, but allows local governments to allocate or sell the use rights and 
retain the proceeds. The local governments can: 
  Charge market rents, and use the proceeds to deliver government services. Then for 
given government services, China can tax less. This increases the disposable income 
of workers and firms, which they can save. In 2006, sales of land use rights accounted 
for 35 percent of the revenue of local governments. 
  Charge below-market rents to firms (e.g. to attract them to start up locally and pay 
local business taxes). This increases the profits of firms, which they can save. 
  Charge below-market rents to workers. This increases their disposable income, which 
they can save. 
  Use the proceeds from the sale of land use rights to fund new investments. The local 
government would own these new firms. It typically collects business taxes but 
refrains from collecting dividends. 
Whatever the prices of B-to-B, B-to-C and B-to-G transactions in China, Chinese local 
governments, firms and workers would jointly enjoy additional opportunities to save.  
The firms set up by local governments either from land sales or from their legacy of state 
assets or from reinvested profits need not pay dividends. As previously discussed, this would 
show up as additional opportunities to save, either by firms or by workers. 
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Many Chinese farmers pay below-market rents for their land. So they can enjoy decent living 
standards, despite receiving lower prices for their output than their international counterparts. 
Many Chinese workers enjoy low rents from state housing, low prices of food grown on low-
rent state land and low prices from Chinese firms that can pay low wages and rents. So they 
can enjoy decent living standards, despite receiving lower wages than their international 
counterparts. And the firms employing them can charge low prices and still earn good profits. 
In fact, these two points explain the relatively high purchasing power of China’s currency 
that was noted above: costs in rival economies are hiked up by market-driven rents. 
The land on the edge of China’s cities is being converted to urban use only after substantial 
economic growth has taken place, so local governments capture the capital gains and use 
them to fund new firms, i.e., these firms are funded from the growth process itself and 
thereafter added to corporate savings, since they do not pay dividends to the local 
governments. This contrasts with other countries where land is privately owned: the landlords 
capture the capital gains. Insofar as they invest these capital gains in firms, they would expect 
dividends thenceforth. 
Behind China’s High Savings: Mao and Deng 
The above discussion traces China’s high savings to the state assets that were: 
  “Liberated” from landlords and capitalist after 1949. 
  Built up in the central planning era, when central planners set wages low so that state 
enterprises enjoyed high profits that could be reinvested to build up state assets. 
  Created/maintained through loans from state banks during the transition from central 
planning (which were often paid off from seignorage). 
  Funded from the capital gains on state land as China urbanized. 
  Funded by the reinvested profits of state firms. 
So we can interpret China high savings as:  
  The foregone income and consumption of the landlords and capitalists whose assets 
were “liberated” after 1949, enhanced by subsequent capital gains and income from 
the assets that China built up from their contributions — in effect, the foregone 
consumption of their heirs. 
  The foregone income and consumption of workers during the central planning era —
 enhanced by subsequent capital gains and income from the assets that China built up 
from their contributions — in effect, the foregone consumption of the capitalists who 
have been prevented from owning and operating the firms after 1949. 
  The social capture of the surplus from the improved division of labour as China’s 
economy developed and grew, as manifested in seignorage, capital gains on state land 
through urbanization, and the profits of state firms.    4
Deng’s reforms allowed private enterprise, but the state kept its assets or reinvested the 
proceeds from their sale to create other state assets. State assets had funded social services —
 health, education and pensions. Citizens who exited the state economy lost their entitlement 
to these social services, so they had to save to pay for the services themselves. But the state 
assets continued to grow in value as the reforms deepened. The citizens of China were the 
notional owners, but lacked explicit claims. So they saved twice over: as individuals and via 
the state. 
Conclusions: The Political Economy of Savings 
China’s high national savings are rooted in its institutional structure: the Chinese state has 
assets growing under the management of state-linked firms but these are not offset by explicit 
liabilities to its citizens. By contrast, the institutional structure of the US means that the state 
has heavy explicit liabilities to its citizens (e.g., their entitlements to Social Security and 
Medicare) but lacks assets to support those liabilities.  
Underlying these contrasting institutional structures are contrasting political economies and 
political ideals. The Chinese state is owned by the Communist Party, but retaining ownership 
requires retaining legitimacy. Growing the economy at a high rate confers legitimacy; 
growing a large proportion of assets under Party control provides rewards to the party elite, 
while keeping taxation low. The US state is legitimized by democratic votes — of the current 
generation. So democratic politicians tend to shift liabilities to future generations. The current 
generation trusts the rule of law, specifically, the state’s legally-binding promises to fund 
pensions and health care when it retires. Hence, it feels less pressure to save.  
In sum, China saves at a high rate because it is a “social market economy with Chinese 
characteristics”, just as the US saves at a low rate because it is a democracy under the rule of 
law.   
 